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Abstract. This paper examines social networks, where each agent is characterized by some 
dynamic parameters, the dynamics of which is resulting from the influence of other agents 
having their own objective functions and limiting factors, as well as from control/governing 
body with its own objective function. In this paper, referring to the type of social networks 
described above, the following two interrelated problems are investigated: the problem of 
determining the degree of information influence on social networks; the problem of finding 
optimal control in social networks. 




Contemporary social networks represent a social structure consisting of 
many subjects (i.e. individual and/or collective agents – individuals; households; 
families; professional groups; organizations; etc.) with a given set of relations 
(i.e. a set of connections between subjects – dating; friendship; partnership, 
professional cooperation; common ideological or religious beliefs; political or 
economic views and opinions; etc.). Referring to the type of considered social 
network, its subject can be either passive (in the case when the main 
characteristic of this subject changes according to some given law, based on the 
characteristics of the subjects related to it) or active (in the case when this 
subject himself/herself chooses a characteristic, for example, action or inaction, 
etc.). Mathematical modelling of social networks, as a rule, is limited to 
consideration of social networks with passive subjects; in some rare cases, 
networks with active subjects are considered. It is important that when
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modelling real social networks, the main common factors are taken into account, 
which, in our opinion, are: (a) structural and topological laws and properties of 
social networks; (b) proper opinions of the subjects of social networks, which 
can be changed both under the influence of other subjects (fully or partially 
biased or impartial), as well as due to various off-network factors of the 
surrounding reality; (c) a degree of authority/significance/trust of the opinions of 
some subjects for the other subjects; (d) dynamic degree of socio-psycho-
political-economic susceptibility of subjects to influence; (e) the threshold of 
subjects' sensitivity to the dynamics of the opinions of both other subjects of 
social networks as well as subjects not being a part of the network; (f) temporary 
avalanche effects called cascades; (g) the degree of incomplete and/or 
asymmetric awareness of subjects when they make decisions both in conditions 
of uncertainty and in cascades; (h) the possibility of forming coalitions; 
(i) information control. The results of social networks modelling without taking 
into account at least the above basic general factors cannot claim to be adequate 
(for instance, see Gubanov, Novikov, & Chkhartishvili, 2010). 
In the late 90s of the last century, there was a massive collapse of the so-
called dot-com (.com) companies and this phenomenon, sensitive for the 
Internet technology industry, has contributed immensely to the revision of the 
basic laws of social networks, which were considered almost immutable: 
asymptotic laws about the value of social networks – Sarnoff's, Metcalfe's, and 
Reed's Laws (for instance, see Kovarik, 2015; Simeonov, 2006; Reed, 1999, 
2001; Farris, Pfeifer, & Johnson, 2009); information field formation laws (for 
instance, see Bukharin, Kovalev, & Malkov, 2009; Bukharin & Malkov, 2010; 
Chernets, Bazlova, & Ivanova, 2010; Gubanov, 2020; Malkov, 2016; Gubanov 
et al., 2010); laws of formation, dynamics and influence of opinions (Nguyen, 
Xiao, Xu, Wu, & Xia, 2020; Galam, 2012; Xiong & Liu, 2014; Gubanov, 
Novikov, & Chkhartishvili, 2009; Grabich & Rusinowska, 2010; Rusinowska & 
Swart, 2007; see also relatively old work Hoede & Bakker, 1982, which is 
important in terms of its subsequent influences); etc. As a result, there have 
appeared other laws and regulations, methods and approaches, and even 
qualitatively new concepts (for more information on these methods and concepts 
see fundamental monographs Jackson, 2008; Gubanov et al., 2010; Fowler & 
Christakis, 2011; Amati, Lomi, & Mira, 2018; Razis, Anagnostopoulos, & 
Zeadally, 2020; Johnson, Turnbull, Maher, & Reisslein, 2021; see also the 
voluminous article Gubanov et al., 2009). Due to the aforementioned revision, 
mathematical models of various levels have been constructed and studied (many 
of them only partially) to describe and understand various aspects of sustainable 
existence, functioning, safety and reliability, development, value, influence, 
danger and regulation of social networks. The scientific methods used in this 
case cover various areas of mathematics: theory of sets, probability theory and 
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mathematical statistics, theory of graphs, mathematical logic theory (both 
Boolean algebra, multivalued logic and temporal logic), discrete optimization, 
and even linear and non-linear differential and integral equations.  
In this paper, we study social networks whose subjects are of a combined 
nature, i.e. can behave both actively and passively. In other words, we study a 
social network, each subject of which is characterized by some dynamic 
parameters, the dynamics of which is determined by the influence of both other 
subjects and the governing body (in the sense of a stimulation), which has its 
proper goal (i.e. the stimulating objective function). In addition, it is assumed 
that each subject also has its proper goal (i.e. the individual objective function) 
and can choose its action within the limits of the imposed restrictions. In the 
assumptions made, the essence of the studied problem, i.e. the problem of 
determining the weights of subjects and finding the optimal information control 
of subjects in social networks of the selected type is as follows:  
− development of an algorithm for determining the subjects’ 
significance coefficients on the basis of the values of a certain set of 
measured parameters; 
− establishing relationships between the subjects’ significance 
coefficients, actions of subjects, types of subjects’ activity (i.e., 
construction of subjects’ individual objective functions and its related 
restrictions); 
− finding a necessary and sufficient condition under which the 
objectives of the subjects reach its maximum (i.e. finding the non-zero 
Nash Equilibrium: for instance, see Nash, 1950; Nash, 1951; Dutta, 
1999; Vasin & Morozov, 2005); 
− formalization of the governing/stimulating body objective in the social 
network and finding conditions for the characteristics of subjects and 
types of activity, which fulfillment leads to function objective of the 
governing/stimulating body reaching its maximum. 
Remark 1. Let us emphasize that in this work we reject the frequently used 
(sometimes even considered as well-established) assumption about the same 
significance/value of subjects within a localized group of a social network (i.e., 
within an interest group, where the opinions of different subjects are quite 
close), and, in some works, from a mathematical point of view, this assumption 
is present in disguise, although the description text of these works speaks about 
the difference in the significance levels of the subjects. In our opinion, this 
assumption is not strictly scientifically substantiated, and although it facilitates 
the construction and, most importantly, the study of mathematical models 
having a focus on various problems of social networks, it substantially narrows 
down the limit of their adequacy and, therefore, reduces the reliability of the 
 
Guseynov et al., 2021. Determination of Subjects’ Significance Rate and Optimal Information 






obtained results, which later on are used for putting forward hypotheses, making 
forecasts, formulating recommendations, etc. For example, let us consider a 
social network S  with n  subjects, (i.e., ( )card SN n= ), where the -thi  subject is 
characterized by numerical indicators/parameters 0ix ≥  and ( )0,1 ,iw ∈  meaning 
the chosen action (strategy; response; behavior; evaluation; contribution; 
donation; etc.) and the significance/weight of this subject, respectively 
(generally speaking, the number of indicators – numeric and non-numeric, 
characterizing each subject of a social network, can be much greater, but at the 
moment we are interested in only two numeric indicators – the chosen action 
and the significance of the subject). It is obvious that even if for some event, for 
example, the United States presidential election, the cost of the -thi  subject's 
chosen action dominates over the cost of the -thj  subject's action, 0,i jx x> >  
then it is quite possible that the real (true; effective; final) value i iw x⋅  of the 
-thi  subject's action will be less than the real value j jw x⋅  of the -thj  subject's 
action, 0 .i i j jw x w x< ⋅ < ⋅  This circumstance is typical not only for social 
networks, it takes place very often in various areas of our daily life – in 
educational processes, in financial and economic assessments, in determining 
the quality of the environment, in sports competitions, etc.: for example, the 
knowledge of a student or a pupil in a particular discipline may be assessed 
differently in different educational establishments with different weights (here 
the weight will denote the quality of education). In the third section of this 
paper, we will get back to this question, exploring it in more details. End of 
Remark (EOR) 
 
Mathematical Models, and their Description and Interpretation 
 
Let us consider a social network S  with subjects { } 1,i i ns =  of a combined 
nature (see Introduction), and let us suppose that the subject is  is characterized 
by three indicators ( ); ; ,i i iw x c  where the numerical indicator 0iw >  characterizes 
the significance/weight of the subject (within this section, without loss of 
generality, we will assume that the weights { } 1,i i ns =  of network subjects are 
normalized, i.e. ( )
1




w i n w
=
∈ ∀ = =∑ ); a numerical indicator 0ix ≥  
characterizes the cost of an action (often instead of an "action cost", simply the 
term "action" is used), chosen by the subject independently or under the social 
network or off-network informational influence of other subjects, and/or the 
governing/stimulating body, and/or off-network circumstances regarding any 
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>∑  characterizes the type of network activity (for example, 
awareness/propaganda; organization/mobilization; action/reaction; etc., for 
instance, see Vegh, 2003), within which the subject chooses his action. It is 
important to note that sometimes non-numerical data are used as activity types, 
for example, they are associated with different colours (for instance, see 
Zhilyakova, 2019). 
Since the real value of the is  subject action is inversely proportional to the 
type of network activity, within which this subject chooses his action (the 
greater is the type of activity, the less is the real value of the action: 
, 1,i i
i
w x i n
c
⋅
∀ = ), then the is  subject's applied effort to joint action related to 
some information event in the network will be successful only when the 
difference between the joint efforts of the network subjects and the above 







w xw x L
c=
⋅
⋅ − >∑  Therefore, the subject is  must choose such an action ,ix  








s i i S w x
i
w xf w c x w x w x L
c
 ⋅
≡ ⋅ ⋅ − − → 
 
                  (1) 
 
where ( )1 2, , , ,nw w w w=   ( )1 2, , , ,nc c c c=   ( )1 2, , , ,
T
nx x x x=   ,   means an 
inner product of vectors. 
 
Suppose that the weights w  of the social network's S  subjects are known 
(or are given a priori, or found based on some reason, for example, following the 
approach proposed in the next section). Then, taking into account the fact that 
the function ( ), ;
is
f w c x  depends on all variables 1 2, , , ,nx x x  is the objective 
function of only the -this  subject of the network, then for all actions x  of the 
subjects { } 1,i i ns =  of the social network S  we obtain the problem of vector 
unconditional optimization 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }1 2 ,, ; , ; , , ; , , , ; max,n
def
S s s s w x
F w c x f w c x f w c x f w c x≡ →           (2) 
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which using the Goal attainment method of Gembicki (for instance, see 
Gembicki, 1973; Gembicki & Haimes, 1973; Steuer, 1986; Fleming & 
Pashkevich, 1986; Aleksejevs, Guseinovs, Medvedev, & Guseynov, 2017) is 












s n s s
F w c x x





 − ⋅ ≥ =
                           (3) 
 
where ( )1 2 1, , , , ,
T
n nx x x x x +=   
*
is
f  is the solution to the one-criterion scalar 
unconstrained optimization problem (1) for the given weights w  of the network 
subjects, i.e. ( )* arg max , ; .
i is sx
f f w c x=  It is possible to find in an explicit form 






 using the necessary condition (point x  is a critical point, 










 should be satisfied) and the sufficient 
condition (the Hessian matrix ,
is









j k j k
f w c x
Hf
x x
 ∂ =  ∂ ∂  
 should 
be a negative-definite matrix) for the maximum of the function ( ), ;
is
f w c x  to 
exist (as we assumed that the weights w  are known, then function ( ), ;
is
f w c x  is 
a function of the x  argument) in 0, 1, .ix i n≥ =  










 we obtain that the 
nonzero stationary point x  of the ( ), ; , 1,
is
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−∑  is 








>∑  that we have imposed above 
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⋅ ⋅ − < = =  ∂   = ∂ ∂ 


                  (5) 
 
then we can assert that the stationary point x  with coordinates (4) is the 
maximum point for the function ( ), ;
is
f w c x  from (1), i.e. point x  with 
coordinates (4) is a non-zero equilibrium action of network subjects { } 1,i i ns =  of 
network .S  Finally, substituting (3) in the expression of the function ( ), ;
is
f w c x  
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There remains to consider the case of inactivity (that is, the perfectly 






1, ; 1 ,
i i
s i i S i ix x
i
f w c x w x L w x
c=
 









, ; 12 1 0i
i
s
i i S i
i ix x
f w c x









follows that null point 0x =  also is an equilibrium point by Nash. An interesting 
statement was proved in (Fedyanin & Chkhartishvili, 2010) that if ( ), ;SF w c x  
has a Nash equilibrium point and if the actions of at least one of the network 
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subjects are equal to zero, then this equilibrium point will be exactly the null 
point 0.x =  
So, the solution to the one-criterion conditional optimization problem (4), 
where the significance/value { } 1,i i nw =  of subjects { } 1,i i ns =  of a network S  are 




 are found according to formula (6), 
determines the Pareto optimal choice of actions of network subjects: the value of 
any of the criteria in the vector unconstrained optimization problem (2) can be 
improved only by deterioration of the values of the remaining criteria. Here, 
without going into details, we would like to note that the problem (3) and the 
problem 
( ) ( )
2 2
1 1




s S xi i i
w xf w c x w x w x L
c= =
⋅
= ⋅ − − →∑ ∑  
are not equivalent problems, although both of these one-criterion problems are 
generated by the same original problem (2) of vector unconditional 
optimization, and are different ways to solve (2) by reducing it to a one-criterion 
problem: we insist that the problem (3) is more preferable because of its 
scientifically based derivation from (2) (see: Coello Coello, Lamont, & van 
Veldhuizen, 2007; Steuer, 1986; Keeney & Raiffa, 1993; Gembicki, 1973). 
Now let us discuss three of the many possible objectives of a network 
control/governing body (for instance, see Gubanov et al., 2010; Volodenkov, 
2015; McKenney & White, 2018; Goyal, Karamchandani, Chatterjee, & 
Manjunath, 2019): (A) the objective of neutralizing the actions of network 
subjects; (B) the objective of a softly regulated weakening of the actions of 
network subjects; (C) the purpose of a softly regulated strengthening of the 
actions of network subjects. 
In the case where the objective of the network control/governing body is 
(A), then we can formulate the optimization problem 
 
( ) ( ) ( ), ; ,arg max , ; max,
def
SA x c
G w c x w F w c xλ≡ ⋅ →                  (7) 
 
where 0λ ≤  is a parameter, the value of which is set by the control/governing 
body. For example, the choice 1λ = −  in (7) corresponds to the fact that the 
objective of the control/governing body is to create such types ( )1 2, , , nc c c c=   
of network activity so that the Pareto-optimal solution ( )arg max , ;Sxx F w c x=  of 
the network subjects would turn into a benefit in the amount 1,nx +−  thus, turned 
out to be as much damaging as the amount total actions made by network 
subjects. The choice of 0λ =  in (7) corresponds to the fact that the objective of 
the control/governing body is to exclude non-zero Nash equilibrium actions of 
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network subjects. Obviously, in order to achieve that, the control/governing 
body only needs to succeed in creation of network activity types 








<∑  or max 2 ,1c n≤ +  where 
max 1,
max ii nc c==  (in (Fedyanin & Chkhartishvili, 2010) a more accurate/better 
estimate has been found). 
In the case where the objective of the control/governing body in the 
network is (B), then we can formulate the optimization problem 













i i i i i
G y w y
y Y

















∏                  (8) 
 
where { } 1,i i nw =  are the values/weights of network subjects (without breaking the 
generality, we can assume that ( )
1




w i n w
=
∈ ∀ = =∑ ); { } 1,i i ny =  are the 
sought-for costs of efforts/influences of the control/governing body; Y  is the 
maximum total cost of effort that the control/governing body can afford (often 
Y  is referred to as a resource); { } { } { }1, 1, 1,, ,i i ii n i n i nα β γ= = =  are controllable 
parameters of the control/governing body: iα  characterizes the initial type of 
network activity (i.e., before the action of the governing/stimulating body), 
where the subject is S∈  choses his action; iβ  characterizes the degree of 
weakening of the influence (i.e., the opposite response to the applied effort) of 
the control/governing body on the subject ;is S∈  iγ  characterizes the degree of 
resource use when the effort iy  is applied. 
It is not difficult to verify that the optimization problem (8) has the 
following global solution: 
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  ∑     ⋅ ⋅  = = ⋅       ⋅ ⋅          
∏
 
























 ∑ ⋅ ⋅ 
   







Let us note that if we assume 1, 1,i i nγ = ∀ =  and introduce new 





=  then the essential constraint of problem (8) 








=∑  and the objective function ( ) ( )BG y  takes the form 








G y w e θα
−
=
= ⋅ ⋅∑  which coincides with the objective function derived in 
(Fedyanin & Chkhartishvili, 2010) from four assumptions/requirements: 
dependence ( )g y  of the activity type ic  of the subject is S∈  from the impact of 
the control/governing body must be (a) continuous; (b) asymptotically tend to 
zero with increasing influence of control/governing body; (c) equal to the type 
of subject at zero level before impact; (d) decrease monotonically. The 
mathematical formalization of (a), (b) and (d) requirements in the language of 
differential equations means that the dependence of the type of the subject’s 
activity on the impact of the control/governing body is described by the equation 
( ) ( ),i i ig y g yδ′ = − ⋅  and requirement (c) means the condition ( ) 0 0 .i iyg y α= + =  
The solution of the obtained boundary value problem will be a function 
( ) ,i iyi ig y e δα − ⋅= ⋅  and, therefore, we have obtained an objective function 
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In the case when the objective of the control/governing body in the network 
is (C), then the optimization problem can be formulated as: 
 













i i i i
G y y
y Y
















∑                  (9) 
 
where iβ  characterizes the degree of strengthening of the influence (i.e., direct 
response to the applied effort) of the control/governing body on the subject 
;is S∈  iµ  characterizes the weight/effectiveness of the resource used when the 
effort iy  is applied; the rest of parameters have the same meaning as in the 
problem (8). 
It is not difficult to verify that the optimization problem (9) has the 
























    ⋅  = > =    ⋅ ⋅     
∑
 






























Determining Importance Rates of Subjects in Social Networks 
 
Let us consider again a social network S  with subjects { } 1,i i ns =  of a 
combined nature, and again let us suppose that the subject is  is characterized by 
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three indicators ( ); ; ,i i iw x c  which has the same meaning as in the previous 
section of this work. Let us suppose that during a period of time { }1 2, , , KT t t t=   
(as a time unit in T  one can pick, for example, day, week, month, etc.), M  
significant events were discussed in the social network S , and the subject is S∈  
has actively participated in iM  of them, , 1, .iM M i n≤ =  Let us denote by m  the 
number of those unique different events M , where all subjects { } 1,i i ns =  have 
actively participated. Let us denote by , ,i k jx  the measured integral 
cost/assessment/indicator for the various activities of the subject is S∈  ( )1,i n=  
within the -thj  ( )=1,mj  event within a kt  time unit. Then the following 
expression can be interpreted as the effectiveness/success of the "network 
activity" of the subject is S∈  during a time unit kt  within the frames of all m  
events: 
 
( ), , ,
1
, 1, , 1, ,
m
i k i k j j
j
E A x B i n k Kξ
=
= ⋅ ⋅ + ∀ = =∑                   (10) 
 
where jξ  is the desired weight/significance of the integral assessment of the 
is S∈  subject's activities within the -thj  event for the kt  time unit; the constants 
,A B  are assumed to be known and are found from Fisher statistic. 
Remark 2. In fact, in (10) the weights ξ  also depend on the indices 1,i n= , 
and 1, ,k K=  i.e., in general case { } 1,, , 1, ; 1, .
i K




=  Taking in formula (10) 
{ }
1,
,j j mξ ξ ==  we have assumed on default that each event has its own rock-solid 
importance, which is constant for different subjects of the network for the entire 
period of time { }1 2, , , .KT t t t=   Obviously, this is not the case: the same event, 
even for the same person at different times, can be of completely different value 
and importance. There could be given countless examples from the field of 
science and technology, from economics, medicine, politics, sociology, etc. 
EOR  
Expression (10) is a system of linear algebraic equations with n K⋅  




, the left side 
{ }, 1, ; 1,i k i n k KE = = of the system is also unknown), and, therefore, system (10) is not a 
normal system, and its solution should be refined (Tikhonov & Arsenin, 1977 ). 
However, before proceeding to the construction of an algorithm for solving 
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 are found, how to 
determine the weights/importance { } 1,i i nw =  of the network subjects? In order to 
answer this question, let us return to Remark 2, where it has been stated that in 
general case { } 1,, , 1, ; 1, .
i K




=  So, if { } 1,, , 1, ; 1,
i K




 were found, then for each 
fixed index { }1,2, ,i n∈   they would average { } 1,, , 1, ; 1,
i K




 over the indices 
1, ,j m=  1, ,k K=  and the obtained result would be taken as (arithmetic mean; 
root mean square; cubic mean; etc.) weight/significance , 1, .iw i n=  Another way 
is to find the norm of matrices (for example, Euclidean norms; ,p qL  norm, etc.) 
{ } 1,, , 1, ; 1,
i K




 for each fixed index { }1,2, , .i n∈   These methods of determining 
weights { } 1,i i nw =  are quite logical and legitimate. In our case, we have { } 1, ,j j mξ =
and the above-mentioned methods (also other legitimate methods, for instance, 
see Feller, 1968; Bellman, 1997) do not allow determining the values of the n
parameters by indirectly measured m  numbers. The approach outlined below, 
which is based on the fundamental concept of Tikhonov's regularization 
(Tikhonov & Arsenin, 1977), allows, first, to reduce system (10) to a normal 
system with n K m⋅ +  equations and unknowns, and second, to find a stable 
pseudosolution (regularized solution) of the resulting system, and, thirdly, to 
determine the desired { } 1,i i nw =  by the numbers n K m⋅ +  that are already found. 
Let us introduce an extended matrix X  having the size of 
( ) ( ),n K n K m⋅ × ⋅ +  whose elements , ,i k jx  are calculated by the formula 
 
( ) ( )( )








if j m K i k j K m
x if j m K i k j K m
A x if j m
− > ∧ ⋅ + = + −
≡ > ∧ ⋅ + ≠ + −
 ⋅ ≤
             (11) 
 




, 1, , 1, ,
n K m
i k j j
j
x B i n k Kξ
⋅ +
=













< ∀ = ∀ = = + − ⋅ +
  
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j j n K m
ξ
= ⋅ +












the matrix form 
 
.X BΨ =                                                       (13) 
 
So, the original system (10) is reduced to system (13) with n K⋅  equations 
and n K m⋅ +  unknowns { }
1,
.j j n K mξ = ⋅ +Ψ =
  It is obvious that system (13) is an 
underdetermined system. Following the fundamental monograph (Tikhonov & 
Arsenin, 1977), a pseudo-solution of the underdetermined system (13) there will 
be called the vector  
 
* arg min ,X B
Ψ
Ψ = Ψ −

                                             (14) 
 









matrix matrix≤ ∑∑  
Obviously, to find a pseudosolution of system (13), according to (14), it is 




    for the 
existence of a solution it is required to fulfill a condition of the first variation of 
the functional ( ) ,
def
V X BΨ ≡ Ψ −     i.e. we have the equation 
( ) ( ) ( ) 10 2 , ,2
T T TV V V X X X X X Bδ= Ψ = Ψ + ∆Ψ − Ψ = ⋅ ∆Ψ Ψ + ⋅ ∆Ψ −              
from which, due to arbitrariness of increment ∆Ψ , follows the system 
 
,T TX X X BΨ =                                                  (15) 
 
which, unlike system (13), is a normal system with n K m⋅ +  equations and the 
same number of unknowns { }
1,
.j j n K mξ = ⋅ +
  
So, we got that the pseudosolution *Ψ  of the underdetermined system (13) 
is the classical solution of the normal system (15), and vice versa. However, the 
main matrix TX X   of system (15) may turn out to be an ill-conditioned matrix, 
and, therefore, we cannot solve it by any direct methods (analytical or numerical 
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methods). In other words, the solution Ψ  to the normal system (15) cannot be 
expressed by a formula ( ) 1 ,T TX X X B−Ψ =      from which, by virtue of the Cauchy 
inequality ( ) 1 ,T TX X X B−Ψ ≤ ⋅      the stability of the pseudo-solution *Ψ  of 
system (13) would follow. 
Remark 3. It should be noted that ( )det 1,TX X   , generally speaking, is not 
a criterion for the ill-conditioned matrix .TX X   Therefore, in order to clarify the 
question of ill-conditioned of a particular matrix, it is necessary to calculate not 
its determinant in order to reveal how small it is in comparison with one, but the 
conditionality number 
 





T T T T
T
X X





= = ⋅ = ≥
 




where ( )min TX Xλ    and ( )max TX Xλ    are the minimum and maximum eigenvalues 
of matrix .TX X   
Further, in addition to the aforementioned problem of ill-conditioned of the 
normal system (15), hence, the instability of its classical solution, violation of 
the condition ( )det 0TX X ≠   also violates the Hadamard Well-posedness of 
system (13) in the sense of a pseudo-solution, namely, a pseudo-solution as a 
solution of a normal system (15), may turn out to be non-unique, and then it is 
determined up to elements from the kernel ker X  of the principal matrix .X  In 
other words, if the condition ( )det 0TX X ≠   is violated, then the pseudosolution 
is non-unique and all of them are determined up to solutions of a homogeneous 
system of equations 0XΨ =   (this follows from the Fredholm alternative for first 
kind operator equations). Therefore, in the case under consideration, if ( )1Ψ  is 
some pseudosolution of system (13), then any column vector ( ) ( )1 2 ,Ψ =Ψ +Ψ    
where ( )2 ker ,XΨ ∈   will also be a pseudosolution of system (13), and all these 
solutions can differ arbitrarily from each other. Therefore, a criterion for 
selection of a solution must be formulated. This criterion is given by the concept 
of a normal pseudo-solution: a pseudo-solution with a minimal Schur norm is 
called a normal pseudo-solution (Tikhonov & Arsenin, 1977). EOR 
So, let us return to the normal system (15). The following iterative 
algorithm that is described below, which is Tikhonov's regularizing algorithm, 
allows us to find a normal pseudosolution of system (15). 
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Step 1. A decreasing sequence of numerical parameters { }m mα ∈  is taken, 
for example, 2 , ,mm mα
−= ∈  and for its two neighboring terms, for example, 
the first two, 1α α=  and 2,α α=  by some direct method (for example, Gaussian 
elimination method) the following system of equations with respect to 
( )2n K m⋅ +  unknowns { }, , 1,m i i m n K mrα = ⋅ +  is solved: 
 
( ), , , ,
1
, , 1, ,
n K m
T
m i m k k i i m
k
r r X X i m n K mα αα β
⋅ +
=
⋅ + ⋅ = = ⋅ +∑    
where 





k i k p i p
p
X X X Xβ
⋅ +
=
= ⋅∑      
 
Step 2. For each of the parameters 
0m
α α=  and 
0 1m
α α += , the coordinates 
{ }
1,m m n K m
αξ
= ⋅ +






m m j i
i
r X B m n K mα αξ
⋅ +
=
= ⋅ ∀ = ⋅ +∑    
 
Step 3. It is verified whether the condition 10 0 ,m mα α ε+Ψ −Ψ ≤   is satisfied 
where ε  is a desired reasonable accuracy (for example, 310ε −= ) of the 
approximate normal pseudo-solution to the exact/theoretical solution (which is 
unknown). If the answer is positive, then at the end of the algorithm an 
approximate normal pseudosolution { }*
1,j n K m
α αξ
= ⋅ +
Ψ =   is found, and, therefore, 
the sought ones { }, 1, ; 1,i k i n k KE = =  and { } 1,j i mξ =  are found in the original system (10): 
,i k jE
αξ=   at 1, ;j m n K m= + ⋅ +  
j j
αξ ξ=   at 1, .j m=  
If 10 0 ,m mα α ε+Ψ −Ψ >   then the transition to Step 2 is carried out, letting 
0 0 1m m
α α +=  and 0 01 2.m mα α+ +=  The theoretical justification, which is presented in 
(Dmitriev & Guseynov, 1995), guarantees the finiteness of this algorithm and 
finding of an approximate normal pseudosolution of system (10). 
Finally, the formula 
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= ∀ =  
where { }, 1, ,i i k k KE E ==  { } 1, ,i i nE E ==  determines the desired weights/significance 




This work studies social networks, the subjects of which are of a combined 
nature – they can behave both actively and passively. Under some additional 
assumptions, relationships are established between the selected actions of the 
subjects, the types of network activity, the coefficients of the significance of the 
subjects, and the efforts of the control/governing body in the network. The 
established relations allow formulating a vector unconstrained optimization 
problem for finding coordinated optimal actions of network subjects. Further, 
using the Goal attainment method of Gembicki, the formulated vector 
optimization problem is reduced to a one-criterion conditional optimization 
problem. In addition, in this work, three single-criterion problems of conditional 
optimization are formulated for the optimal impact of the control/governing 
body on the types of actions of the subjects: the objective of the 
control/governing body in the first problem is to neutralize the actions of 
network subjects, in the second problem – realize softly controlled weakening of 
the actions of network subjects, in the third problem is to implement softly 
regulated strengthening of the actions of network subjects. Also, this paper 
investigates the issue of finding the significance coefficients of network subjects 
for a certain set of measured integral indicators of network subjects: a 
mathematical model is constructed and studied, a regularizing iterative 
algorithm is proposed for solving the constructed model, one of the possible 
mechanisms for using the found normal pseudo-solution of the model for 
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